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Abstract
 
This article contends that workfare programmes pursued by various OECD countries since the
mid-
 
1990
 
s do not amount to a fundamental change in policy. The limited potential of  workfare
is due to the fact that it fails to transcend the constraints of  earlier forms of  ‘active’ responses to
unemployment. Furthermore, it suffers from specific policy-making disadvantages not shared by
these responses. The article opens with a survey of  relevant academic debates on the subject. It
then places workfare in a broader context by identifying its functional reach, as compared to other
active policy responses to unemployment such as active labour market policy (ALMP). The third
section analyses workfare policies in the United Kingdom, as developed since 
 
1997
 
, by re-
examining the British New Deal employment programme. That review demonstrates that workfare
policies either depend on their ‘fit’ with the existing policy-making heritage, or that they remain
merely symbolic. The article concludes by suggesting that the potential of  workfare to effect change
in responses to unemployment continues to be of  limited significance. In other words, capitalist
employment and welfare systems continue to be characterized by incremental adaptation rather
than by fundamental regime change as suggested by the critics of  workfare.
 
Keywords
 
Active labour market policy; New Deal; Unemployment; United Kingdom; Welfare reform;
Workfare
 
Introduction
 
The notion that OECD policy-makers are able to use workfare policies effec-
tively on a large scale to replace traditional ‘active’ responses to unemploy-
ment, such as active labour market policies (ALMPs), is open to challenge.
Here, it will be argued that the new discourse on workfare, emerging in the
 
1990
 
s, conceals the underlying path-dependent continuity of  national policy-
making in work/welfare policies, as well as the inherently cyclical pattern of
ALMPs. This is not to deny that workfare policies have become relatively
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more significant in most OECD countries. However, such policies remain
part of  a cyclical pattern of  policy-making in managing the condition of
unemployment and, thus, are severely limited in scope. Workfare as part of
OECD countries’ welfare reform amounts to a ‘groundhog day’ policy:
 
1
 
 any
announcement of  new policies fails to transcend the limitations of  already
existing policies. Conversely, existing policies are doomed to reappear at each
stage of  policy reform. 
Academic debate on workfare has revolved around the consequences of
the abolition of  the largest federal welfare benefit in the United States, the
Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), that occurred in 
 
1996
 
.
The AFDC benefit had acted as a welfare payment for single mothers with
dependent children. Its replacement with the new, more restrictive benefit,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), during the second Clin-
ton presidency triggered an OECD-wide debate on ‘welfare reform’, as well
as other policies concerning the interaction between the out of  work
population, the state and the labour market. This debate tended to gloss
over the differences between the unique US welfare and employment system
and other OECD countries (Peters 
 
2005
 
). Since the mid-
 
1990
 
s, the language
and discourse of  welfare reform has proliferated along parallel lines in many
different institutional settings. Terms such as ‘workfare’, ‘welfare to work’
and ‘activation’ started to enter national debates on labour market issues in
OECD countries and the European Union (Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer
 
2004
 
; Dostal 
 
2004
 
). 
In a first wave of  scholarship on the broader significance of  workfare
policies, analysts often suggested that ‘policy learning’ between the USA and
other OECD countries was taking place. Policy-makers in the United King-
dom were seen to be learning from the US experience and, indeed, ‘policy
transfer’ from the latter country to the former was claimed to have occurred
(Dolowitz 
 
et al. 
 
2000
 
). One commentator went so far as to contend that workfare
was part and parcel of  an underlying structural transformation of  advanced
capitalist countries from a ‘Keynesian welfare national state’ towards a ‘Schumpe-
terian postnational workfare regime’ ( Jessop 
 
2002
 
: 
 
100
 
). More recently, a
second wave of  analyses emerged. This questioned the earlier emphasis on
cross-national learning, policy transfer and structural transformation. The
second wave authors instead chose to stress the theme of  national trajectories
in policy-making and of  cultural and institutional differences between coun-
tries (Mohr 
 
2004
 
; Casey and Gold 
 
2005
 
).
The argument presented here belongs to the second wave of  scholarship,
but it differs in important respects. Its point of  departure is Hall’s seminal
analytical distinction (
 
1993
 
: 
 
278
 
–
 
80
 
) between policy paradigms, policy instru-
ments and instrument settings. Hall holds that a change in policy paradigms,
namely the shift from an old to a new paradigm, is the most significant
indicator of  policy change over time. Such a paradigm shift subsequently
triggers changes in the selection of  policy instrument and also influences
particular instrument settings within each policy instrument. However, this
raises the question of  what happens if  a new paradigm fails to bridge the gap
between changes in the discursive framing of  problems and the subsequent
shift from old to new policy instruments. In other words, it asks what actually
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happens when modifications in paradigms cannot be backed up by funda-
mentally new policy approaches. The contention here is that workfare
cannot fulfil the expectations of  its advocates. On the other hand, despite the
suggestion of  some of  its critics, the contention is also that workfare does not
constitute an element of  a new form of  capitalism with its own employment
and welfare systems.
Thus, examining workfare demonstrates that it is not a fundamentally
new policy but, nevertheless, that it differs from traditional ALMP and that,
at times, it can add to or replace earlier policies. It also demonstrates that
workfare policies, once pursued, encounter limits that derive from the struc-
ture of  the labour market. These structural limits are beyond policy-makers’
ability to control, and they lay open to question the significance of  the new
policy at the implementation level. Whatever policy-makers’ intentions
happen to be, workfare is bound to disappoint them and to amount to a
‘workfare illusion’, as will be demonstrated below.
Furthermore, analysis of  workfare as a policy instrument is also bound
to be linked to broader policy-making paradigms such as recent notions of
‘activation’ and of  the ‘activating state’ (Handler 
 
2003
 
). These policy para-
digms sometimes grant workfare a high priority at the implementation level.
However, they must also accommodate a variety of  underlying normative
political orientations. Even if  notions of  ‘activation’ become accepted as new
paradigms, their interpretation remains contested. Such notions can act to
support traditional ALMP as much as workfare. One author, therefore, has
argued that the concept of  workfare is too normative and too narrow to
deserve separate analytical attention and that analysis should instead focus
on the level of  broader paradigms, and notably on activation (Barbier 
 
2005
 
:
 
8
 
–
 
9
 
). However, it will be demonstrated that analysis at the level of  policy
instruments better helps to capture recent policy-making – namely ‘spill-
over’ of  workfare policies from the Anglo-American to the continental Euro-
pean countries. Nevertheless, it will also show that this does not signify the
rise of  a ‘workfare state’. Rather, incremental changes in the implementation
of  already existing national active policies are likely to occur.
 
The Debate on Workfare
 
After a summary of  past and current academic debates on workfare, the
broader policy-making environment of  these policies will be analysed. Later,
it will be shown that workfare will and must fail to deliver fundamental
policy change at the implementation level. This thesis will be developed
through a study of  the alleged case of  workfare in the UK – the New Deal
employment programme for the young and long-term unemployed (and
other benefit recipients) that has operated since 
 
1998
 
. Following this, the
evidence that both critics and supporters of  workfare policies have over-
played their relative policy-making significance will be summarized.
The term ‘workfare’ comes from the USA and first entered public discourse
during the Nixon presidency in the late 
 
1960
 
s. In the 
 
1970
 
s, workfare was
frequently used in American debates on welfare issues to describe employ-
ment programmes such as the failed plan of  Michael Dukakis, Governor of
 22
 
© 
 
2007
 
 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 
 
2007
 
 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
 
S
 
ocial
 
 P
 
olicy
 
 & A
 
dministration, 
 
V
 
ol
 
. 
 
42
 
, N
 
o
 
. 
 
1
 
, F
 
ebruary
 
 
 
2008
 
Massachusetts, to advance a Work Experience Programme (WEP) for AFDC
recipients in 
 
1977
 
. Another example was the Reagan administration’s Com-
munity Work Experience Programme (CWEP), which passed Congress in
 
1982
 
, targeting welfare recipients with obligatory work programmes (Lipman
 
1977; Gottschalk 1998: 92). From the early 1980s, the term became used in
the UK. Observers suggested, for example, that changes in rules governing
public employment schemes for young people in Britain turned such programmes
into ‘workfare in all but name’ (Lee et al. 1990: 4). Crucially, most analysts
were agreed that workfare policies did not amount to a fundamental innova-
tion in the management of  work/welfare policies. Rather, observers suggested
that such policies preserved and resuscitated the heritage of  ‘work tests’ in
earlier systems of  poor relief  such as the Victorian workhouse and of  public
work programmes during the world economic recession of  the 1930s (Wilkinson
2001).
However, this long-standing workfare debate did not result in any agreed
definition of  the concept. While early commentators suggested that workfare
‘was a concept in search of  a programme’ (Frank, quoted in Lipman 1977:
143), latter-day observers could not agree what the concept entailed. This
remains the case today, although programmes have certainly increasingly
been implemented since the 1970s. Most analysts hold that workfare relates
to a concept in which ‘benefits are given in return for work’, thereby suggest-
ing policies in which ‘those who refuse to participate in training or employment
lose state benefits’ (Digby 1989: 6, 113). This basic definition of  workfare states
that ‘mandatory work in exchange for benefits’ makes welfare clients ‘work
off ’ their payments (Rose 2001). Other observers put forward a more discrim-
inating notion, and hold that workfare policies concern only those welfare
clients who find themselves in social assistance programmes of  last resort.
They also define three core components of  workfare policies, namely (1) their
compulsory character; (2) their primary focus on work; and (3) direct target-
ing of  clients in the lowest tier of  state assistance (Lødemel and Trickey
2001). Building on this definition, one author has suggested that workfare
offers clients employment conditions that are inferior to comparative work
in the mainstream labour market (Kildal 2000: 3).
This short, but representative, sample of  opinions on workfare demonstrates
conceptual ambiguity on a number of  counts. First, there is no agreement
about what defines the instrument settings of  workfare. Therefore, one might inquire
into whether one should focus on these instrument settings, or on principles
that inform their application. Equally, one might ask at what point ‘active’
policy responses to unemployment amount to workfare and whether active
programmes necessarily become workfare once they are made obligatory for
clients (White 2004).
Second, it is actually unclear how the element of  ‘work’ in workfare
schemes is defined as a policy instrument. Some observers suggest that workfare
includes other activities, such as training on the clients’ part alongside work,
that feature in other active policy responses to unemployment, particularly
traditional ALMPs. One author holds, for example, that only a strict ‘work-
first’ feature in programme implementation defines workfare concepts proper
and separates them from earlier education and training policies for the
© 2007 The Author(s) 23
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unemployed (Mead 2001: 529). Yet even if  one accepts this concept of  work-first,
one would still have to scrutinize the character of  ‘work’ that is actually
performed in workfare programmes. In fact, this work falls into a variety of
sub-activities, such as work for pay below the ‘going rate’, ‘additional’ work
in the public sector, and various other ‘activities’ that could still be inter-
preted as ‘training’ as much as ‘work’.
Third, the framing of  workfare activities – that is, the selection of  policy
paradigms that inform and legitimize policy choice – is crucial for the purpose
of  evaluation and analysis. In many cases, workfare differs from earlier ‘active’
policies in response to unemployment in terms of  normative discourse, rather
than in terms of  programme content, actual client obligation or performed
activities.2 Four major political frames for workfare in OECD countries can
be identified on normative grounds: (1) social democratic; (2) labourist; (3)
social conservative; and (4) neo-liberal. 
In the social democratic discursive frame, workfare is very close to existing
ALMPs, many of  which are already obligatory to clients. This particularly
concerns training policies that aim to develop the skills of  unemployed workers
in accordance with human capital approaches. The goal of  such policies
is to insert workers into mainstream employment. To this end, the policy
instrument of  choice is the provision of  training for the unemployed. Such
policies aim to avoid segmented labour markets and the development of  low-wage
sectors. They also avoid subsidization of  low-wage labour through in-work
benefits such as tax credits. Sweden, despite frequent bouts of  self-doubt,
remains the model country for such policies (Anxo and Niklasson 2004: 14–
16, 36).3
In the labourist discursive frame, formal inclusion in the labour market is
highlighted, and the quality of  employment is of  secondary importance.
Workfare is understood as the organization of  transition between inactivity
and any available job. The goal of  workfare policies is to provide for social
inclusion through a combination of  paid employment plus in-work benefits
for those whose market income remains below subsistence level. Such policies
place the main emphasis on enforcing participation in the labour market, but
they accept that the state must redistribute income through the tax system
post hoc and must maintain some level of  solidaristic redistribution among
different sections of  the labour force. Nevertheless, the labourist system
accepts segmented labour markets, large skill dispersion and a high degree
of  wage inequality. Contemporary Britain has emerged as the ideal-type
country representing the labourist workfare discourse (Salais 2004: 292).
The social conservative discursive frame conceives of  workfare as part of  the
moral (counter-)reform of  society. This interpretation of  workfare stresses
various ethical and societal values including self-reliance, behavioural control
of  clients and family formation. It also talks of  a ‘new paternalism’ in social
policy-making (Mead 1997). The goal is to link workfare programmes with
norms and values, thereby applying workfare as a socio-cultural tool rather
than as an end in itself. From an ideal-type perspective, one can locate the
social conservative workfare discourse at the level of  competition between
and within political parties. One might identify sections of  the Republican
and Democratic Parties in the USA, as well as sections of  conservative and
24 © 2007 The Author(s)
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Christian Democratic parties in Europe, as those who adhere to this
approach.
Finally, the neo-liberal discursive frame conceptualizes workfare as part of  a
strategy to minimize states’ regulatory role in the labour market. Here, work-
fare programmes have the limited objective of  speeding up clients’ re-
employment. Although not hostile to education and training policies as such,
advocates of  neo-liberalism demand that these policies should be organized
by private providers as markets rather than the state. They aim to run work-
fare policies as ‘slim’ operations without any broader concern for education
and training issues. Their goal is rather limited in scope – to increase outflow
from benefits by reorganizing the benefit system in a manner that increases
benefit conditionality, cuts entitlements and reduces overall spending levels.
Another key feature of  the neo-liberal workfare approach is its eagerness
to introduce market mechanisms into programme delivery itself. This can
involve ‘contracting out’, partial or full privatization of  employment services
and paying the latter by results. All these features serve to turn programme
delivery into an agency-changing strategy that challenges the legitimacy of
any direct labour market intervention. In the 1980s, UK policies were typical
of  this approach (Ginsburg 2001).
In order to analyse workfare further, one must acknowledge the crucial
importance of  both discursive competition and discursive agreement between
the four major normative positions on workfare. Each of  the four positions
grants legitimacy for workfare as a policy. Yet each position also favours
rather different instrument settings for workfare. The four positions overlap
in certain ways, but are opposed in others. For example, the labourist and
neo-liberal positions might agree on work-first approaches, but they disagree
on whether or not in-work benefits are necessary to correct market outcomes.
On the other hand, both the social conservative and the labourist approaches
stress concerns with societal values and a normative commitment to the
‘right to work’. One must, therefore, acknowledge that workfare policies can be
the result of  compromise between different policy paradigms and that their
existence depends on political coalition-building. In sum, the exact overlap
between different policy paradigms on the issue of  workfare is not fixed.
Policy entrepreneurship connects policy-making paradigms with policy
instruments and instrument settings, and thereby determines the workfare
policies of  the OECD countries.
Workfare in its Broader Policy-making Context
This section puts forward an ideal-type overview of  all policy options that
concern ‘active’ responses to unemployment in OECD countries. It does this
by scrutinizing the differences between traditional ALMP and more recent
workfare. In order to clarify these differences, one must first examine how
ALMP (the concept) and ALMPs (the policies) have been defined in the
academic debate before and after their rise to OECD-wide prominence in
the 1960s.
The earliest comprehensive concept of  ALMP emerged in Sweden in the
1950s. ALMP formed one element of  the country’s full employment strategy
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– the ‘Rehn-Meidner model’, named after two prominent economists of  the
Swedish trade union federation LO. This model combined restrictive macro-
economic fiscal and monetary policies with economy-wide wage coordination
to guarantee full employment. Within the framework of  the model, ALMPs
performed a labour-mobilizing role – speeding up workers’ transition from
traditional to modern sectors of  employment (Blyth 2002: 121–3).
Swedish ALMPs were general in scope. They demanded that workers
accept sectoral and/or regional mobility. However, the element of  compulsion
was balanced out by economy-wide solidaristic wage bargaining. A coordi-
nated wage-setting process between trade unions and employers established
a single national wage rate in each field of  employment. Thus, it encouraged
the increased provision of  education and training policies for all sections of
labour. National wage coordination supported investment in human capital
to increase labour productivity across the economy as a whole. At the same
time, employment in less productive firms and sectors of  the economy declined
as these were unable to pay wage increases that rose along with national
productivity growth. The role of  ALMPs, then, was to enable the un-
employed to take up opportunities in the growth firms and sectors. It placed
emphasis on the development of  their human capital through training and
subsequent movement from low- to high-productivity employment. In sum,
despite the element of  compulsion, ‘first-wave’ ALMP was different from
contemporary workfare in so far as it made a direct connection between
compulsion and solidaristic wage policies, human capital generation and
productivity growth (Erixon 1997; Meidner 1998). Moreover, Swedish first-
wave ALMP was very demanding in institutional terms. Consequently, the
‘bundle’ of  Swedish policies had to be ‘untied’ in order to make the concept
applicable in other OECD countries.
From the mid-1960s, the transition from first-wave ALMP to second-wave
ALMP took place. Initially, institutions such as the OECD began to disseminate
ALMP under the banner of  ‘active manpower policies’. After 1973, when
structural mass unemployment reappeared in many OECD countries,
second-wave ALMP became more prominent. Crucially, ALMP ceased to be
directly linked with macro-economic policy-making and became more limited
in scope. It now involved the extension of  public employment services, a limited
commitment to education and training policies and, at least initially, some
support for ad hoc public sector job creation. Thus, the strong human capital
orientation of  the first wave was downgraded in the second wave. By now, any
kind of  labour market training became defined as active policy. Only after
this transition in the early 1970s did second-wave ALMP emerge on an OECD-
wide scale. ALMP tried to do ‘more with less’: due to rising unemployment,
the supply of  potential clients for active schemes increased. However, at the
same time, the earlier commitment to human capital development declined.
Thus, the ‘separating-off ’ of  ALMP from broader macro-economic policies
left these policies without any overarching policy paradigm (Dostal 2004:
441–2). In this context, eclectic workfare-style policies began to enter the
OECD debate in small steps from the mid-1970s, but they were only fully
acknowledged in the 1990s. Young people, in particular, were singled out for
recruitment into obligatory programmes, and their right of  access to passive
26 © 2007 The Author(s)
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benefits was made dependent on participation in active policies. From the
mid-1970s, many ‘quasi-workfarist’ features, such as obligatory participation
in schemes where the human capital-building orientation was notional rather
than substantial, became part of  the active response to unemployment. The
difference between these and more recent workfare schemes was more to be
found in the way they were described at the level of  discourse rather than
their content.
In order to analyse similarities and differences between earlier ALMP and
recent workfare, a taxonomy of  all potential policy responses to the condition
of  unemployment as well as other forms of  ‘inactivity’ is required. Such a
taxonomy can help to establish an analytical borderline between ALMP and
workfare; it also clarifies the relative degree of  influence of  workfare approaches
on political responses to unemployment in OECD countries.
Established active responses to unemployment can be divided into four
‘ideal-types’ that, taken together, cover all currently existing policy instru-
ments in the field of  work/welfare policies. These ideal-types concern (1)
general ALMPs; (2) targeted ALMPs; (3) market workfare; (4) ‘make-work’
workfare. Each of  these four policy-types shares the application of  a certain
similar instrument setting, namely the application of  ‘status-changing’ policy
tools that assist or compel benefit recipients to cooperate in attempts to move
them into work, training or other activities. The most fundamental distinc-
tion between ALMPs and workfare at the level of  policy instruments is that
the former concentrate on human capital development through education
and training policies. Workfare, on the other hand, is based on a work- or
activity-first approach, which gives priority to rapid labour force attachment
over all other policy goals (Peck 2001; Theodore and Peck 2000). Thus,
ALMPs aim to improve the labour market prospects of  the unemployed by
improving their skills prior to, or simultaneously with, insertion into employ-
ment. Workfare aims to move clients into work and ‘activities’, without
parallel attempts to raise their skill levels as part of  programme design. In
the words of  one anonymous supervisor of  US workfare implementation:
‘You do not need to get an education to get a job; to get a job, you need to
work’ (quoted in Mead 2001: 529).
Another crucial analytical step is to acknowledge that ALMPs and work-
fare both entail two major subcategories. First, ALMPs can be directed towards
a wide population, or they can be aimed at certain target groups. In the first
case, general ALMPs serve the purpose of  improving skill levels across all sectors
of  a national labour force. Such general ALMPs are part of  a strategy to
improve workers’ skills and to link skill generation with labour market mobi-
lization and mobility. They depend for their success on other labour market
mechanisms such as solidaristic wage bargaining, coordination between
employment sectors and a high degree of  labour market homogeneity. They
also require policy-makers to take effective steps to avoid segmented labour
markets, and in particular low-wage sectors that are not linked with the
overarching wage coordination system. It follows that general ALMPs have
always remained rather exceptional in the OECD. Such policies were pursued
in Sweden and some other Nordic countries, but could not be transferred to
other OECD countries.
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By contrast, the second category of  targeted ALMPs has been much more
commonly used across the OECD world. Here, policies focus on specific
target groups in the labour market such as young people, older workers, the
long-term unemployed and other disadvantaged groups. They involve differ-
ent degrees of  commitment to clients, and they include education and train-
ing efforts as well as public work creation in the service of  training objectives.
At one end of  the spectrum, such policies entail support for clients to parti-
cipate in vocational training or higher education. They might offer substantial
commitment to improve clients’ long-term prospects in the labour market.
At the other end of  the spectrum, they involve short-term courses with a very
low degree of  human capital development, and they often have a rather
symbolic content. Typically, the more generous targeted ALMPs are strongly
biased towards young people and aim to reinsert them into mainstream
education and training. On the other hand, short-term courses are often
targeted at the long-term unemployed to ‘interrupt’ the unemployment spell
through active measures – at least for statistical purposes. Follow-up studies
of  clients who have participated in long-term programmes with a substantive
human capital content and in short-term programmes of  the work-first type
do not give consistent results. In some cases, programmes with the highest
degree of  human capital generation, such as long-term vocational training,
perform much better than short-term programmes (Lechner et al. 2005: 43, 49).
In other cases, short-term programmes are most successful in reinserting people
into employment, particularly if  evaluation adopts an agnostic view on the
quality of  the employment in question (Martin 2000). However, only some of
these differences can be explained by internal features of  targeted ALMPs.
Most of  them derive from differences in national employment systems. For
example, countries with a developed vocational training system might produce
better results through the use of  long-term programmes rather than short-term
programmes aimed at inserting workers into low-skilled employment.4
The third and fourth types of  active policies cover workfare. Here, it is
crucial to acknowledge that workfare consists of  two rather different con-
cepts, namely market workfare and make-work workfare. The former concept
relates to the labour market and waged labour, while the latter relates to the
administrative imposition of  ‘work’ by the authorities responsible for paying
benefits. In the case of  market workfare, the focus is on moving benefit-
dependent groups, such as the long-term unemployed, lone parents and the
sick and disabled, closer to the labour market. In particular, market workfare
aims to make these groups more ‘employable’ through administrative means,
especially through fiscal policies that subsidize low-wage employment. By
doing so, it aims to control wage inflation by ensuring that an effective
‘reserve army’ of  labour exists: all ‘workless’ groups, not just the officially
unemployed, are turned into potential low-wage workers. It is to be noted
that this particular form of  workfare differs from its traditional and more
narrow definition of  forcing clients to work in return for their benefits, as is
the case in make-work workfare (Grover and Stewart 1999, 2000; Grover
2003: 18; Koch et al. 2005: 20).
However, ‘market workfare’ (the term used by Grover and Stewart) is
more difficult to analyse than most observers have so far acknowledged.
28 © 2007 The Author(s)
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While Grover is correct to argue that market workfare concerns policies that
pursue a close relationship between the reserve army and the labour market,
he fails to appreciate the actual policy mix which has been advanced by the
Labour government since 1997. As Peter Mandelson correctly stated in 1998:
‘[the] welfare-to-work programme makes the labour market flexible . . . It
increases the supply of  labour in the economy, its quality and its employability’
(quoted in Grover 2003: 19; emphasis added). What this suggests is that market
workfare operates as part of  a broader strategy that acknowledges the trade-off
in policy between a pure low-wage strategy and a more complex strategy that
tries to put pressure on wages while increasing effective skill supply. More-
over, market workfare tries to do this without prioritizing one goal at the cost
of  the other. In short, British market workfare includes a large number of
interrelated policies, such as the national minimum wage, in-work benefits,
national childcare strategy, as well as the various New Deal programmes for
different categories of  the unemployed (cf. the next section). More recently,
it has also included attempts to question existing entitlements in other British
benefit programmes such as Incapacity Benefit. This makes it appropriate to
speak about a particular British style of  market workfare, which consists of  a
combination of  policy instruments not prevalent in other countries.
In the USA, on the other hand, market workfare was used in many federal
states to provide private employers with direct access to the welfare population.
In some cases, private companies became directly involved in the running of
welfare-to-work programmes in order that they might fill entry-level posi-
tions in areas with high costs of  living, where labour recruitment had become
difficult. Thus, US-style market workfare was concerned with direct admin-
istrative measures to fill vacancies. By contrast, British market workfare
entailed a larger number of  policy instruments and, paradoxically, placed
more trust in market outcomes. It relied on the notion that increased effec-
tive supply would generate increased employment in entry-level jobs, while
avoiding any large-scale extension of  make-work programmes. To summa-
rize, versions of  market workfare in Britain and the USA share some similarities,
but they differ in terms of  programme implementation. Both countries sub-
sidize low-wage workers through tax credits, but the British programme is
considerably more generous to single earners and part-time workers (Blundell
2001; Mead 2004). This is a crucial difference, as it serves to limit the weekly
working hours of  single earners in the UK. By contrast, many single earners
in the USA work very long hours to achieve a subsistence-level income. In the
UK, longer hours of  employment simply trigger the withdrawal of  in-work
benefits.
Furthermore, market workfare differs at the level of  policy implementation
from targeted ALMPs. Whenever clients enter low-wage employment under
market workfare they are subsidized by in-work benefits. However, there is
no commitment to education or training. On the other hand, whenever such
employment offers education and training, it can be classified as a version of
targeted ALMPs. Thus, the decisive difference between ALMPs and market
workfare is the formal commitment to education and training in programme
implementation, although targeted ALMPs tend to overlap in practice with
market workfare if  the commitment to skill development is weak.
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Finally, make-work workfare is the policy instrument of  last resort. It con-
cerns clients who have failed to gain employment in the private or public
sector and entails ‘work for the dole’. Here, the benefit authorities create
a ‘work test’ that consists of  activities outside of  the regular labour market to
check clients’ willingness to be available for work in order to keep their
benefit entitlement. Yet make-work workfare faces a number of  crucial
shortcomings that limit its applicability and reach. Such policies must be
‘additional’ to avoid competition with existing private and public sector
employment. Consequently, the work must take place under the control
of  some public authority. This suggests employment of  a ‘non-productive’ or
‘symbolic’ character. Yet such policies then fail to give clients access to any
marketable skills, and they might even stigmatize them further. Thus, for
everyone concerned, make-work workfare is ‘artificial’ employment of  doubt-
ful utility. One might argue that the actual function of  such policies is to act
as a disciplinary device rather than an active response to unemployment.
However, many clients with a long-term benefit history already hold very low
expectations. Often, they do not perceive such work schemes as punitive and
willingly accept the imposition of  ‘activity’. In this case, public authorities
might face the rise of  a large sector of  unproductive labour under their direct
administrative command, and they have to take direct responsibility for the
weakest client groups in public work schemes of  last resort. Thus, the work
test might fail to motivate clients to search for waged employment, especially
if  clients’ expected market wage is very low.
To sum up, the four major ‘active’ policy responses to unemployment
often appear less distinctive than the current typology suggests. In fact, all
policies are located on a sliding scale and crucially depend on certain shared
instrument settings. They all aim to ease client transitions from benefit status
to work, other activities, transfer between benefits, exclusion from the benefit
system, or, indeed, from the status of  ‘officially recognized unemployment’ to
some ‘undeserving status’. In fact, this burden-shifting function can feature
in each of  the four policies discussed above. Instrument settings all feature
prominently, including direct wage subsidies, in-work benefits, temporary
subsidies for self-employment, and administrative redefinitions of  criteria for
benefit entitlement that are intended to enforce status change away from
unemployment. Often, criteria for ‘officially recognized unemployment’
status are made more discriminating, thereby excluding certain groups, such
as young people or cohabiting partners with one partner in employment,
from the unemployment count. At other times, benefit entitlements are simply
cut. The political character of  such status-changing tools depends entirely
on their relationship to larger policy objectives that derive from the four
policies already discussed (compare table 1).
The division of  OECD states’ ‘active’ responses to unemployment into the
four ideal-type responses allows all existing policy instruments – i.e., the
individual components of  any ‘active’ programme – to be linked with one of
the analytical categories.5 Table 1 shows the analytical distinction between
the two versions of  ALMP as well as between the two versions of  workfare.
The overarching difference between both policy categories is the distinction
between the human capital approach of  ALMPs and the exclusive concern
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Table 1
Four ideal-type responses to unemployment and ‘inactivity’ in OECD countries
Policy instrument General ALMPs Targeted ALMPs Market workfare Make-work workfare
Target population All workers Target groups 
such as young 
and older 
workers, 
disadvantaged 
groups
All workers in the 
low-wage sector
Long-term 
benefit clients 
Instrument settings Large-scale 
education and 
training policies 
informed by 
national 
standard-setting 
bodies 
Some education 
and training 
policies, 
temporary wage 
subsidies for 
employers 
or employees
Permanent 
in-work benefits 
for employees 
delivered through 
the tax/benefit 
system
Additional work 
creation outside 
of  the wage labour 
system under state 
supervision
Policy goals General increase 
of  human capital of  
average worker, 
increase in labour 
productivity
Redistribution 
of  labour 
market risk in 
favour of  workers 
with below-average 
human capital
Maximization of  
quantitative 
employment 
outcomes without 
concern for labour 
productivity
Work test, screening of  
the benefit population
Application Sweden from the 
1950s until the 
early 1990s
Most OECD 
countries 
since the 1970s
Many OECD 
countries, most 
common in liberal 
welfare regimes 
since the 
1980s
Many OECD countries, more 
prominent since the 1990s
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for labour force attachment in workfare approaches. This distinction is crucial
in the analysis of  policy-making content of  ‘active’ responses to unemploy-
ment at the national level.
For the purposes of  policy analysis, OECD welfare regime types will con-
tinue to differ with regard to their particular policy mix between versions of
ALMP and versions of  workfare. Yet all OECD countries currently cover at
least some features of  the last three categories of  policies outlined in table 1
– that is, targeted ALMP, market workfare and make-work workfare.
The next section turns to the UK case to demonstrate that post-1997
welfare reform has not challenged the underlying continuity of  ‘active’
responses to unemployment. Rather, welfare reform has resulted in a
reorganization of  trade-offs between the three major policy instruments.
Crucially, the fundamentally cyclical pattern of  policy-making remains
in place: the rise of  tax–benefit policies to encourage the take-up of  work
and to increase the employment headcount continues to interact with and
compete with policies that focus primarily on human capital development
and attempts to increase the quality of  employment.
The Case of  the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2007: 
Workfare Discourse without Workfare?
Since 1997, the British Labour government has been keen to claim in public
that it has managed to find new ways of  dealing with the problem of  un-
employment. In an oft-quoted phrase, its discourse has stressed that the welfare
state should be transformed from a ‘safety net of  demands into a springboard
of  self-responsibility’ (Blair and Schröder 1999; my translation). The British
response to unemployment has been the New Deal (ND) programme, which
is also sometimes referred to as welfare reform. This programme, introduced
in 1998 and initially funded by a windfall tax on the privatized utilities, has
been exceptionally successful in capturing the imagination of  academic social
policy observers. It was also successful in communication exercises by the
Labour government with the broader public and the mass media. Most
early observers suggested that the ND amounted to ‘workfare’. Participation
in the programme was made obligatory for unemployed clients receiving the
Jobseeker’s Allowance ( JSA), the major out-of-work benefit in Britain after a
client had spent a certain period on ‘passive’ benefits. Some analysts also
suggested that UK policy derived from transatlantic policy learning and was
inspired by the US experience (Daguerre 2004).
However, this early interpretation has become less convincing on a
number of  counts. Its only remaining strong point is its stress on the
similarities of  the discourse on workfare between the USA and the UK. Yet
as soon as one moves from discourse to practical policy-making, analysing
the level of  policy instruments, the claim of  extensive ‘policy learning’ by the
UK from the USA can no longer be maintained. First, the British benefit
system is too complex and entrenched to offer a springboard for US-style
abolition of  passive programmes. Second, its administration of  unemploy-
ment and ‘inactivity’ has always been highly dualistic as far as the structure
of  the benefit system is concerned. Its major historic feature has been its
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characteristic shift of  ‘difficult’ groups among the unemployed from the
‘claimant count’ of  clients receiving JSA to a secondary benefit, Incapacity
Benefit (IB),6 which is granted on health grounds as a National Insurance
benefit, or to Income Support (IS) as the means-tested benefit of  last resort
(Alcock 2006: 182–4). Only the JSA client group has been subject to ‘actively
seeking work’ rules since 1989, making the granting of  benefit conditional on
job search. By contrast, the IB and IS client groups have historically been
excluded from ‘active’ policies. This dualistic feature of  the British benefit
system has resulted in regular migration of  ‘difficult’ long-term clients away
from the ‘active’ JSA regime to the ‘passive’ IB/IS regime. Such client transfer
had a structural component, being a reaction to deteriorations in the labour
market, but was sometimes also steered according to political convenience.
Whenever ‘opened’, the transfer of  clients from active to passive benefits
brought down official British unemployment figures, which are defined as the
JSA claimant count (Beatty and Fothergill 2003; Price 2000: 250–1).7
Most recently, this process has been slowed down and the number of  IB
recipients has been stabilized at the historically high level of  around
2.7 million. It remains contested, however, whether this is due to government
reforms or a general improvement in the labour market. Nevertheless, the
dualistic features of  the benefit system remain in place. Research on partici-
pants’ destinations after participating in active programmes makes clear that
many clients circulate back and forth between these programmes and passive
benefits (Carpenter 2006: 21–2).
Thus, the point of  departure of  recent welfare reform in the UK was the
acceptance of  the policy-making heritage of  benefit dualism. In fact, resources
for active responses to unemployment still continue to be concentrated on
those sections of  the unemployed judged to be closest to the labour market.
The ND programme is first and foremost an attempt to communicate with
the broader public and to maximize political credit-claiming. It aims to
present a number of  very different programmes for different target groups as
belonging to a single ‘delivery platform’. At first glance, all ND programmes
appear to belong to a single coherent, active response to unemployment. Yet
the various programmes – most significantly the ND for young people
(NDYP), ND 25 plus (ND25) for the long-term unemployed aged 25 to 49,8
and ND for lone parents (NDLP) – were in fact different programmes involv-
ing different policy instruments for different target groups (National Statistics
2004; Jobcentre Plus 2005). The programme essentially continues the tradi-
tion of  earlier ALMPs to ‘target’ resources on the most promising client
groups, namely younger workers who are most likely to pay back investment
in their human capital at a later point in time in subsequent benefit savings.
By far the largest share of  spending on ND programmes concerns NDYP
and, to a lesser extent, ND25, while spending on other ND programmes for
‘non-traditional’ clients such as lone parents has been comparatively small.
Moreover, due to declining UK unemployment since the mid-1990s, the
number of  people participating in the ND programmes has been much lower
than was the case for earlier active programmes in the late 1970s and 1980s.
The most significant feature of  the ND has been the introduction of  a new
terminology to describe the long-standing institutional practices of  the
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Jobcentre (the British Public Employment Service). This new terminology
concerns the interaction between Jobcentre staff  and their clients. Crucially,
for the overwhelming majority of  ND clients the programme amounts to a
change in their interview regime at the Jobcentre, rather than any direct
offer of  active programmes. In fact, most clients enter neither ALMPs,
nor market or make-work workfare (Dostal 2005: 279–93). Thus, the ND
programme has been perceived as successful in the eyes of  the public because
its internal properties aim to avoid risk-taking at the implementation level.
In the language of  Hall (1993), the ND mainly concerns the adaptation of
already existing ‘instrument settings’, i.e. the interview regime at Jobcentres,
rather than a shift of  emphasis from passive to active policies. In fact, the
active elements of  the programme are very limited in scope and reach. They
largely concern those client groups that already enjoyed access to active
policies in earlier programmes. 
To show that this is, indeed, the correct way of  interpreting the logic of
the ND programmes since 1998, the following analysis looks at the three
main ND options (NDYP, ND25 and NDLP) and considers their internal
properties in accordance with the division of  policy instruments advanced in
table 1 (cf. the previous section).
The most important programme, NDYP, deals with unemployed clients
aged 18 to 24 who enter the programme after an uninterrupted six-month
spell on JSA in the so-called ‘gateway’. The gateway is a time span of  six months
during which client advisers conduct fortnightly interviews to find as many
employment opportunities as possible for their clients. Even very short place-
ments in employment interrupt the spell in JSA for the purposes of  the
programme and count as a successful outcome. For two-thirds of  young
people, the gateway is the ND experience and only a minority of  participants
enter the second stage – the so-called ‘options’. The options, in turn, aim to
improve the employability of  young people who cannot obtain unsubsidized
jobs in the private sector (Finn 2003). They consist of  vocational education
of  up to 52 weeks; subsidized short-term employment in the private sector;
and work in the voluntary sector or in an environmental task force. First, the
educational option belongs to traditional targeted ALMP due to its human
capital orientation. Second, in the subsidized employment option, the con-
tribution to clients’ human capital is so limited in scope that one can qualify
the option as located on the borderline between targeted ALMP and market
workfare. Finally, the work option in the voluntary sector and the environmen-
tal task force is a ‘last resort’ solution and amounts to make-work workfare
(compare table 1). Crucially, the workfare features of  the non-educational
options are made less severe due to the circulation of  clients back to passive
JSA after participation in the active ND options. Thus, clients who fail to
enter employment continue to circulate between options and the regular
benefit system. Once their option is over, they re-enter the interview routine
in the Jobcentre and either regain their previous JSA benefit status or move
on to other benefits, as is frequently the case.
The second major programme, ND25, for long-term unemployed clients
aged between 25 and 49, targets clients who previously received JSA for
24 months (since 2001, the period has been 18 months). This programme
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demands that clients enter an ‘advisory process’ of  between three and six
months, which consists of  an increased number of  interviews conducted by
Jobcentre staff. This process was subsequently renamed ‘gateway’ in order to
increase presentational similarities with the NDYP. However, the ND25 does
not offer the same degree of  access to ‘options’ such as subsidized employ-
ment or full-time education. Such instruments were only available to a small
number of  ND25 clients, while the majority simply moved back towards JSA
status once the advisory process was finished. In 2001, the programme was
changed in line with the NDYP and a new device of  the ‘intensive activity
period’ (IAP) was added to the gateway. This IAP period lasts for 13 weeks
(in exceptional cases up to 26 weeks) and includes options such as work
experience; work placement with employers; occupational training; help with
motivation and soft skills; and a ‘basic employability training’ (Coleman et al.
2004: 5–7). What all these options have in common is that they are cheaper
to provide, are of  shorter duration and have minimal or no human capital
focus in programme content in comparison with the more generous NDYP
options.
The third programme, NDLP, is even more limited in scope. In can be
accessed by lone parents receiving Income Support, which is the British
benefit of  last resort for single parents who are normally not expected to
work until their children reach the age of  14. Since April 2001 all lone
parents have been obliged to participate in mandatory ‘work-focused
interviews’ (WFI) once their youngest child reaches the age of  five years and
three months. These interviews take place on an annual basis and do not
require lone parents to accept any subsequent work obligation. From October
2004, the interviews have included a so-called ‘mandatory action plan’.
This change is interesting to observe on account of  its misleading termino-
logy, as it places mandatory obligations on benefit advisers rather than on
clients. That is, it becomes ‘compulsory for advisers to complete an action plan
during all lone parent work focused interviews . . . [T]hese plans do not have
to be agreed by the lone parent or include any further action or “next step”
which need to be completed by the lone parent before the next WFI’
(Thomas and Jones 2006: 25; emphasis added). The rather symbolic nature
of  this policy is due to the fact that ‘active’ resources continue to be in limited
supply. In fact, they mostly remain targeted at the classical clients of  earlier
ALMPs, namely young people and some sections of  the long-term un-
employed. Thomas and Jones also note a perceived general lack of  training
opportunities available to lone parents (2006: 16), thereby confirming that
nearly a decade of  welfare reform in Britain has not delivered any substantial
extension of  education and training policies to ‘non-traditional’ clients.
In sum, the Labour government’s active policies in response to unemployment,
such as the various ND programmes, have tried to project the impression of
a ‘tightening-up’ of  the benefit regime to the broader public. However, actual
policy change has been limited in scope and has mostly focused on the
renaming of  existing policy instruments such as the interview regime between
Jobcentre staff  and their clients. Thus, access to active employment measures
is still limited. Such measures mostly concern short spells in work or basic
skill training, as was already well known from earlier British ALMPs in the
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1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, they also follow the classical hierarchy of
target group policy-making in earlier ALMPs, with a primary focus on young
people, a secondary focus on the long-term unemployed, but with much
lower spending per client in comparison with the first group, and a tertiary
focus evident only in some symbolic spending on all other groups.
Therefore, to the extent that there is any increase in the rate of  ‘activation’
of  clients at all in comparison with earlier periods, it is due to the tight limit
on spending for expensive human capital measures such as education and
training. In fact, the large majority of  active measures refer only to work
experience without substantial training content and fairly short periods of
client activation. Furthermore, the direct imposition of  workfare-type policies
is narrowly limited in scope and includes a time limit on participation in
‘make-work’ schemes, after which clients are allowed to re-enter the passive
benefit regime. This concerns essentially the NDYP and some of  its ‘options’,
as previously discussed. Overall, the policing of  the system in terms of  benefit
sanctions has remained similar to that operating in the pre-Labour and pre-
New Deal period. Most benefit sanctions are short-term and result from the
failure of  clients to make themselves available for interviews rather than any
more specific policing in a workfare manner.9 The entire ND programme
amounts to a rather successful attempt to maximize political credit-claiming
within existing resource constraints. In fact, the ND changes the paradig-
matic discourse of  earlier ALMPs without any parallel shift in actual policy
implementation. The programme speaks in the language of  workfare to the
broader public, but mostly avoids such policies in the actual interaction with
clients.
This underlying continuity has also remained in place in the latest effort
to reform the Incapacity Benefit. The government Green Paper (26 January
2006) focused on new efforts to move people from IB back towards main-
stream active programmes whenever feasible. This effort was based on the
planned renaming of  IB as ‘Employment and Support Allowance’ from
2008. This new measure would involve a new client capability assessment
that distinguishes between ‘eligibility for the benefit and capability for work’
(DWP 2006a: 12, 39). In order to improve targeted support for IB clients, the
government suggests the extension of  the currently voluntary ‘Pathway to
Work’ programmes of  adult training. However, these attempts to change
existing boundaries between clients, agencies and benefit assessments have
run into strong criticism from disability rights groups, whose representatives
question policies that are based on obligatory ‘work-related activities’ and
instead demand individual targeted support on a voluntary basis (DWP
2006b: 16).
Looking at the larger picture, one can again detect the underlying cyclical
pattern of  trade-offs in ‘active’ policy-making. In the period since 1997, most
efforts had been conducted under the banner of  ‘welfare to work’, thereby
extending active provisions to more and more client groups – with the most
difficult IB reform attempt as the final stage of  the cycle. These efforts have
been based on curtailment of  spending per client for education and training
efforts with an increase in spending on tax credits (the British version of  in-
work benefits).
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Yet most recently, policy initiatives point once again towards increased
emphasis on ‘classical’ education and training efforts. The British govern-
ment has been keen to expand certified training provisions for young workers
and for already employed workers without qualifications. This has resulted
in changed funding priorities, moving resources away from existing adult
education courses to a more narrow focus on level 2 National Vocational
Qualifications (Kingston 2006). However, these moves have come at a high
cost – they include shifts in agency control from the Jobcentre to the Learning
and Skills Council and a destabilization of  existing adult educational provi-
sions. Any future reform effort will continue to face the problem that clients
who are furthest away from the labour market might be less attractive to support
in an active manner than those who are close to the mainstream labour
market. Neither welfare reform nor the renaming of  agencies and benefits
will change this underlying pattern of  continuity, and it will necessarily result
in the periodical shift of  funding back towards core constituencies.
Conclusion
Ever since their rise to OECD-wide prominence in the 1970s, ‘active’
responses to unemployment have suffered from policy-makers’ unrealistic
expectations about their potential abilities to exercise direct causal influence
on employment levels. Yet the success or failure of  ALMP is essentially deter-
mined more by macro-economic policies than by the inherent design features
of  the measures themselves. In spite of  the decline of  Keynesian doctrines in
the steering of  the economic cycle, the relative success of  ALMPs remains
dependent on macro-economic performance. Shifts in the internal properties
of  active policies are always of  secondary importance. Furthermore, the
fundamental properties of  active policy instruments remain similar over time,
although the credit-claiming discourse might change. Such policies concern
supply-side issues in the labour market as well as the policing of  the passive
benefit system. Policy-making continually circulates between efforts to increase
human capital generation through education and training schemes and efforts
to force the unemployed to take substandard jobs in the hope that their
prospects might improve over time once they are employed. In addition, the
policing of  the passive benefit system periodically gives rise to the introduc-
tion of  ‘work tests’ that are organized by public authorities to check clients’
willingness to accept the direct imposition of  work to protect their benefit
entitlement.
In spite of  underlying policy-making continuity, policy-makers can always
resort to the one single element of  active responses to unemployment that
can be changed at very low cost: discourse. There is no doubt that policy-
makers’ legitimizing discourses and credit-claiming efforts have changed
considerably since the 1990s. The rise of  workfare as the object of  credit-
claiming has certainly been a new feature. However, one should not confuse
workfare discourse, as a symptom of  neo-liberal restructuring within OECD
capitalism, with the actual substance of  neo-liberal policy change. In fact, the
policy-making instrument of  workfare is not significant enough to exercise
any major causal influence on its own. The main object of  neo-liberal
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restructuring efforts remains people who are in or close to the labour market,
rather than those sections of  society whose labour market attachment is
weak. Thus, the shift in discourse away from earlier solidaristic interpreta-
tions of  ALMP to the current concern to accept market outcomes, or to limit
policy-making to some remedial action through in-work benefits, is one out-
come of  neo-liberal restructuring, but it is not where the major emphasis is
placed. Rather, the most recent discourse could be seen as the reappearance
of  classical liberal doctrine to subordinate state intervention to the aim of
making the labour market supposedly more efficient.
Turning towards the level of  policy instruments, three major policy
instruments are currently available to OECD policy-makers: (1) targeted
ALMPs; (2) market workfare; and (3) make-work workfare. In the case of
ALMP, the former Swedish version of  general ALMP as an element of  ‘Key-
nesianism in one country’ has run its course. What remains possible are
more limited education and training efforts in targeted ALMPs. As for work-
fare, the drawing of  a clear analytical distinction between its two manifesta-
tions, namely market workfare and make-work workfare, amounts to a major
analytical step forward. However, one must once again stress that promoting
market workfare, based on in-work benefits for low-wage workers, as ana-
lysed by Grover and others, does not represent a fundamental change of
policy. Rather, such policies aim to improve the trade-off  between ‘free’ wage
labour and the direct administrative imposition of  work. Under market
workfare – but not under make-work workfare – the private employer remains
in charge of  enforcing discipline in the workplace. Thus, the system of  sub-
sidizing low-wage labour through in-work benefits does not point towards
fundamental policy change, but rather to incremental adaptation of  the
existing tax/benefit system. In fact, the granting of  tax privileges to groups
with a low degree of  labour market attachment and the ignoring of  casual
and low-hour employment for the purposes of  taxation existed long before
the rise of  in-work benefits.
Hence, the large-scale introduction of  in-work benefits in liberal welfare
regimes is simply an acknowledgement of  the fact that workers are unable to
offer their labour power for wages below subsistence rates. Moreover, these
benefits are financed through increased taxation of  median earners and, in
practice, replace certain formerly available passive benefits. Thus, in-work
benefits constitute ‘solidarity within one class’, even if  mediated through the
fiscal state rather than through union-driven solidaristic wage bargaining.
Such benefits also encourage employers to change their managerial strategies
in favour of  increasing the employment headcount, rather than to increase
workers’ average productivity through education and training. The major
reason for the introduction of  in-work benefits is that this policy takes advan-
tage of  the disciplinary power of  private employers – which would be absent
in the case of  direct imposition of  work. In sum, market workfare influences
existing instrument settings of  the tax/benefit system but does not transcend
their limitations.
This leads to another major point: any kind of  active response to unemploy-
ment – regardless of  its political inspiration in social democratic, labourist,
social conservative or neo-liberal normative frameworks – exercises a
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rather limited influence on employers’ choices. All active policies, including
those that aim for solidaristic redistribution of  labour market risk, use rather
weak tools to influence employers. Most evaluations of  active responses to
unemployment conclude that efforts to improve the position of  marginal
workers through employment subsidies or education and training efforts will
be ignored by employers, as long as the level of  unemployment is sufficient
to ensure an adequate supply of  qualified workers. Under such conditions,
employers will choose to employ workers with recent labour market attach-
ment, rather than workers with a long-term unemployment record, even if
the latter worker would be subsidized by public funds. This demonstrates
another paradox of  active policies: their actual impact on labour market
outcomes will be weakest when demand for them should be highest, that is,
during periods of  a cyclical increase in unemployment.
In conclusion, the actual potential of  the ‘activation’ of  labour market
policy and of  welfare reform in the OECD remains limited to two major
policy choices. First, the relative balance between each of  the three available
policies – namely, targeted ALMP, market workfare and make-work workfare
– can be changed and each policy can be expanded at the cost of  one of  the
others. Second, ‘general’ instrument settings of  policy-making, such as
funding level and method of  delivery, can also be changed. However, these
changes do not differ fundamentally from other changes in policy that con-
cern resource allocation. They certainly do not point to any fundamental
regime change within OECD capitalism. Moreover, the paradigms, instru-
ments and specific instrument settings also remain similar in their logic over
time. Here, shifts in the normative discourse cannot be backed up by any
fundamental policy-making change at the implementation level.
There is little reason to believe that policy-makers can solve these problems
by shifting towards more authoritarian, active policies. In fact, once OECD
states remove labour market protection of  ‘insiders’, they encounter increased
militancy of  ‘insider’ workers faced with prospects of  redundancy. After all,
active policies often perform the function of  ‘side payment’ in order to limit
the costs that workers incur in the case of  job loss. Once such protective
features are removed, they result in the decline of  corporatist patterns of
policy-making and threaten alliances between social democratic parties and
trade unions in those OECD societies in which they had achieved hegemony
in the past. It is, therefore, important to stress that US-style welfare reform
cannot be compared with reforms made in other OECD societies. The pro-
file of  the AFDC client population in the USA was very different from the
profile of  the unemployed in countries such as Britain and Germany. More-
over, the type of  macro-economic stimulation that has occurred in the USA
since the mid-1990s has not occurred in other OECD countries and the
prospects for employment growth are therefore rather different.
What OECD societies need is a more honest debate between suprana-
tional, national and local actors about the kind of  active policy response to
unemployment they are willing to support. Deliberation should be concerned
with all policy instruments and instrument settings, and the terms of  policy-
making success and failure should be made clear. Crucially, success and
failure cannot be decided upon through some quantitative measurement of
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employment outcomes (Ashiagbor 2005: 178–85). After all, the outcome of
active programmes will always remain overdetermined by macro-economic
factors that these policies cannot influence. Over time, such an open debate
on norms and values could result in a new societal contract that would
determine how the burden of  unemployment should be distributed. Further-
more, such deliberation could also show that neo-liberal hegemony is not a
necessary feature of  the current period, and even that its existence is, in part,
a consequence of  the absence of  debate. The ‘groundhog day’10 experience
of  neo-liberal welfare reform certainly is not the only available option.
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Notes
1. In the film Groundhog Day, actor Bill Murray plays a weatherman who reluctantly
covers a story about a groundhog whose behaviour during an annual village festival
is believed to forecast the end of  winter. The day after covering the ‘event’, Murray
notices that this day is exactly the same as the day before. He already knows
everything that is going to happen and is doomed to spend the rest of  eternity
in the same place, observing the same people doing the same thing every day.
2. For example, the post-1998 German employment scheme for young people
‘Immediate Programme for Youth’ (German abbreviation JUMP) targeted young
people aged below 25 and threatened to withdraw their benefits in order to make
them participate in active measures. The threat of  benefit withdrawal also under-
pinned the German ‘Hartz Reforms’ after 2003. In the former case, no reference
to workfare was made, while post-2003 it was increasingly referred to.
3. The crucial element of  change in recent Swedish ALMPs since 2002 has been
the abolition of  the right of  clients to re-qualify for wage replacement payments
after participation in ALMPs (the ‘carousel effect’). This change challenges clients’
status protection and increases clients’ risk of  experiencing downward mobility
in the event of  them becoming unemployed.
4. There is a tendency in British evaluation of  active policies to suggest that measures
that subsidize employment in the mainstream labour market result in larger
outflow from unemployment than policies that aim to improve clients’ human
capital through education and training. Furthermore, this outflow is sometimes
sustained (Coleman et al. 2004: 19). However, it is difficult to judge whether this
points to inherent superiority of  rapid employment in the workplace or, as is
likely, to the tendency of  benefit advisers to select the ‘strongest’ candidates for
subsidized employment while moving ‘weaker’ candidates to other options,
including skill training. Another major issue in programme evaluation concerns
the duration of  analysis. Many work-first programmes redistribute employment,
while many education and skill programmes redistribute employment trajec-
tories. The latter type of  programme can exercise a long-term influence on
employment status and quality that is captured only in a long-term evaluation of
clients’ subsequent labour market status.
5. There are, of  course, innovations in the field of  active responses to unemploy-
ment that belong to none of  the four categories. For example, the establishment
of  the British Jobcentre Plus network, and the associated use of  ‘personal advisers’
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and ‘work-focused interviews’, does not constitute the introduction of  separate
policy instruments. Instead, it changes the institutional framework for pro-
gramme delivery. However, such institutional change only influences trade-offs
between competing objectives. For example, evaluation of  the Jobcentre Plus –
the new agency that brings the former Benefits Agency (the Social Security
offices) and the Employment Service together – has suggested that small
improvements in job brokering were paid for by parallel substantial decline in
the accuracy of  benefit delivery (Karagiannaki 2007: 11–14).
6. This benefit was known as Invalidity Benefit until 1995. The 1995 reform,
renaming the benefit, was made in order to limit inflow of  new clients through
more rigid screening of  clients’ capability to work.
7. IB performed the functional equivalent of  early retirement policies in other
OECD countries, in so far as it dealt with structural change and the decline of
traditional industrial jobs.
8. In the early literature, the ND25 plus programme was also referred to as the
New Deal for Long-Term Unemployed People (NDLTU). Since then, the term
has been abandoned because of  its self-defeating connotation.
9. Wilkinson reports that ‘only 2.6 per cent of  ND25 plus participants had ever
been sanctioned, with the majority of  these receiving only a two week sanction.
Less than 0.1 per cent of  all ND 25 plus participants have been sanctioned on
more than two occasions’ (2003: 21). The most recent evaluation of  the three major
active benefit regimes JSA, NDYP and ND 25 plus suggests that 96 per cent of
all clients are never sanctioned, while of  the remaining 4 per cent of  clients
73 per cent are sanctioned once, 16 per cent twice and 10 per cent more than
twice (Peters and Joyce 2006: 2, 39).
10. See note 1.
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